some excellent and further thought provoking comments.
Shahan Zafar said...
As you rightly pointed out, it all circles back to education and economic development. A perfect example of that is the United States (North vs. South) or Europe (European Union). Make the economy so very integrated that regional isolationism has financial repercussions. We can celebrate different ethnicities populating Pakistan while still embracing “Pakistaniat.”Furthermore, I couldn’t agree with you more on how disturbing this problem is for Pakistan. In an unfortunate way, this internal problem plaguing Pakistan somewhat necessitates a common enemy (“Hindu”) for us to be loosely united. What happens when we have made peace with India? Will we ever make peace? I admit these are rambling thoughts and questions but worth pondering


Muneeba Omar said...
Haan I am in complete agreement with you about our identity issues. The only think that unites us a nation besides cricket is being pro-kashmir and anti-India. Us ke elawa, each province's population has issues with the other. Here is some an excerpt from my thesis which details the ethnic challenge in Pakistan. "Although Islam provided a unifying element in Pakistan, the ethnic diversity of Pkaistan proved to be a source of dissension and conflicts. The multi-ethnic and multilingual nature of Pakistan constitutes a formidable challenge to its governability and stability. Each of the four provinces (Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab and Sindh) has its own language and is distinct in its cultures and traditions, even though they share the same religion. There is a wide income disparity between the four provinces, with Punjab occupying the lion’s share and earning the resentment of the other poorer provinces. Each province is also plagued by identity issues with the Pathans of the (N.W.F.P.) “having more in common with their Afghan neighbours than with the [Muhajir] Sindhis on the other side of the Indus River, whose culture reflects that of Mughal India. The Punjabis of Lahore inhabit a different civilization from the tribesmen of Baluchistan. Pakistan's Kashmiris are something else entirely.” In fact, the only common trait in the political identity of the provinces is that are pro-Kashmir and anti-India. Rarely seeing eye-to-eye on political issues, disputes have often broken out between the four provinces, with Baluchistan and Sindh threatening to separate. In fact, the conflict between the Baluchis and Pathans in Baluchistan, and between the Sindhis and Muhajirs in Sindh has spiralled out of control with the occurrence of collective ethnic riots in which militant groups for each side have caused extensive damage to life and property (See Figure 13 on page 57 for details on the conflicts). Echoing John Stuart Mill, David Laitin argues that it is impossible to found a democracy in a multi-ethnic and multilingual country, and that authoritarianism would be a more feasible and preferable alternative in such a scenario simply to prevent inter-ethnic violence and conflict. Laitin persuasively argues that democracy can only be established in multi-ethnic states provided that there is strong central control, and that the centre is able to make credible threats to regional/ethnic politicians and movements. In Pakistan, central institutions are extremely weak and dominated by feudal landlords who instead of seeking unity have a history of exploiting internal divisions for short-term advantage. Thus one cannot help but be sceptical about the ability of a democratic centre (controlled by Pakistani elites) to control regional and ethnic divisions. In fact, it was under the democratic governments of Bhutto and Shariff that nationalist groups in Sindh and Baluchiston emerged, complete with violent militant factions. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that the democratic rule would lead to the rise of more ethnic groups, increase political gridlock, and aggravate the conflicts since it facilitates political liberalization and ethnic mobilization. In addition, Pakistani democratic governments were never able to make credible threats to regional/ethnic politicians and movements and always had to rely on the army to control and contain the conflicts and movements in Sindh and Baluchistan. In fact, successive federal governments sought to manipulate ethnic differences to promote their own narrow interests. Thus, it becomes all too evident that the Pakistan’s ethnic reality is not yet conducive to a liberal democracy. In order to prevent and control inter-ethnic violence and conflict, a liberal authoritarian regime headed by a benevolent leader like Musharraf (who also has control over the Army being the Chief of Army Staff) is arguably Pakistan’s best option for inter-ethnic harmony as well as eventual democracy.

moizza said...
I think shahan answered his own question. India’s representation as an enemy will fluctuate in Pakistan’s affections but is unlikely to disappear given the legitimacy it gives to the establishment in terms of uniting the country and defence budget allocations. I have a couple of questions regarding Muneeba’s post somewhere down the line your excerpt seems to suggest that nationalist outbursts were a direct outcome of democratic government (well quasi at least) which implies that nationalist conflict is something that is inherent to Pakistan and so efforts should be focused towards quelling it. However ethnic groups are another form of identity politics and authors like Brueilly mark out ethnicity as just another political resource with which you vie with the center for resources (e.g. language as a tool for the Sindhi movement). Instead of focusing on repressive measures shouldn’t any sort of government in power try to at least address the original concerns of such movements? The rhetoric of ethnicity comes much after very basic deprivations such as unemployment, skewed budget allocations etc. As Jarrar pointed out in his initial post on religious politics, the fundos came up because of income disparity and lack of education and what not. Could be the same for ethnic movements.